Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-hgkh8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-27T09:30:15.804Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Election Laws, Disproportionality and Median Correspondence: Implications for Two Visions of Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2000

G. BINGHAM POWELL JR
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Rochester Department of Political Science, Florida State University
GEORG S. VANBERG
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Rochester Department of Political Science, Florida State University

Abstract

Comparative studies of election rules and legislative representation have focused intensively on vote–seat disproportionality as an indication of poor representation. Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has important advantages and is especially more appropriate for a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of election rules on both vote–seat correspondence and median left–right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions necessary to reduce vote–seat disproportionality in high threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and higher levels) of distortion. Although good median correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this criterion also.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2000 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)