² See e.g. J. Schroter, Plutarchs Stellung zur Skepsis(Leipzig, 1911), p. 21; K. Ziegler, ‘Plutarchos von Chaironeia’, RE,vol. XXI.I, col. 856; W C. Helmbold, p. 227 of his Loeb edition of the deprim. frig. (Moraliavol. XII); J. Glucker, Antiochus and the Late Academy(Gottingen, 1978), pp. 287–8; and J. Dillon, ‘“Orthodoxy” and “Eclecticism”: Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans’, in J. Dillon and A. A. Long (edd.), The Question of "Eclecticism"(Berkeley, 1988), pp. 103–26, esp. p. 107 note 9. P. Donini argues against an attribution of radical scepticism to the deprim. frig,as a whole (see ‘Lo scetticismo Academico, Aristotele e l′unila delta tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco’, in G. Cambiano (ed.), Storiografia e dossografia nellafilosofia antica[Torino, 1986], pp. 203–26, esp. pp. 209–12); but this is because he thinks that there is the possibility of a more positive, ‘metaphysical’ solution opened up by the appeal to the ‘triangles’ of Plato′s Timaeusin de prim. frig.ch. 8. This is something that seems to me rather difficult to maintain, for although Plato′s triangles are the ultimate principles of the physical world (Donini rightly draws attention to 948B), there is no suggestion that they rank with forms, for example, as actually metaphysicalentities, and the fact that they are constituent parts of the physical world actually argues against this possibility. Their non-perceptibility alone certainly does not suffice to push them into a higher ontological category.Google Scholar

³ This is especially clear from some of the titles of Plutarchean works now lost: e.g. Lampriasnos. 45 (On Arguing Both Sides),64 (On the Difference Between the Pyrrhonians and the Academics)and 71 (= 131?) (Concerning the Fact that Prophecy is Not Disproved by the Academics).But cf. also the de communibus notitiis,which is set up as a defence of the sceptical Academy; and de Stoicorum repugnantiis1037BC, where Plutarch defends the actions of ‘those who suspend judgement’ Google Scholar

⁴ The point of this passage is actually to assert that the image of the divine is moreto be found in living creatures, and that these are clearermirrors (of god′s activity. But this only confirms the ontological subordination to the metaphysical realm of the sublunary world as a whole.Google Scholar

⁵ This fragment is, admittedly, of doubtful attribution, and Sandbach, for one, does not believe it to be Plutarchean: see Loeb Moraliavol. XV pp. 388–9 with note (b). However, it is certain that Plutarch held a theory of ) and, if nothing else, the fragment quoted encapsulates nicely the position he must have taken. For further texts on this point, see frr. 215–7 [Sandbach] with, on 215 (d) in particular, D. Scott, ‘Platonic Anamnesis Revisited’, CQ37 (1987), 346–66. There may also be an allusion to the theory of at quaest. conviv.629DE, where Plutarch apologizes if, years after the event, he treats things friends once told him as if he had just thought of them himself. Often, he says, learning something and recollecting are the same in effect: The following caveat should be noted: many of the fragments–especially those collected under 217, which, ironically, even claim to be proofs that learning is recollection′–in fact appeal to memories of past incarnations, something which has nothing to do with dra/zirjcris as an epistemological theory. This suggests that the aim of the fragments was simply to prove the pre-existence of the soul rather than to demonstrate ‘recollection’ of forms. Fr. 217 (a) and (b), far from arguing for the theory of actually presuppose it. All of this, of course, is entirely consistent with the fact that they are derived from a commentary of the Phaedo–see Sandbach, loc. cit.Google Scholar

⁶ Cf. Donini (note 2 above): he discusses at length Plutarch′s frequent displays of evXdfieiatowards theological and metaphysical claims, but draws the conclusion that Plutarch thinks this is allthat is possible in respect of them. (In general, Donini does not seem to take the transcendence of the metaphysical world in Plutarch very seriously and, for example, blurs the distinction between the physical and metaphysical worlds by suggesting that in questions of physics is needed because physical questions ‘hanno un fondamento o un esito nella sfera dell′intelligibile e del divino’ [213].) In fact Donini seems to read too much into the term . Plutarch does not think that there is a certain class of propositions (e.g. theological propositions) which can only ever be given conditional assent.He rather thinks that for anykind of proposition (physical or metaphysical) one should not assent rashly, and to this extent one should exercise caution.If Plutarch is generally cautious in the metaphysical assertions he makes, this does not show that he thinks unconditional knowledge of metaphysics is, even in theory, unobtainable.Google Scholar

⁷ For the ‘clarity’ and positive usefulness of sense impressions, cf. e.g. de soil. an.966BC, where sense-perception gives us ‘clear and unanswerable examples’ of what Plutarch seems to take to be an example of a genuinely plausible position. In de E392AB, Ammonius (whose views are presumably meant to represent those of Plutarch as well) talks of the ‘great clarity’ of objects of perception in the very midst of an argument for the strict unknowability of the world.Google Scholar

⁸ The suggestion that Plutarch′s epistemology was influenced by Philo is far from original, although the form in which this influence is described varies widely. Cf. e.g. Schroter (n. 2 above), pp. 36–7; A. Weische, Cicero und die neue Academie(Munster, 1961), esp. p. 79; H. Tarrant, Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy(Cambridge, 1985), esp. p. 134; A.-M. Ioppolo, ‘The Academic Position of Favorinus of Arelate’, Phronesis38 (1993), 183–213 esp. 195. Donini disagrees (n. 2 above, 213), but his disagreement comes, I think, largely from a belief that to say Plutarch′s epistemological position was influencedby Philo would be tantamount to claiming that it was the sameas Philo′s position. In fact I argue below that while Plutarch certainly owes his sceptical methodology to Philo, his view of why the world is strictly unknowable is radically different.Google Scholar

⁹ Philo′s philosophical development has been the subject of some controversy. Scholars have tended to recognize twostages (generally compounding in one way or another what I would identify as the second and third phases of Philo′s epistemology): cf. e.g. R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zur Ciceros philosophischen Schriften(Leipzig, 1883), vol. Ill, pp. 195–341; V. Brochard, Les Sceptiques Grecs(Paris, 1887), pp. 192–205; D. Sedley, ‘The End of the Academy’, Phronesis26 (1981), 67–75. However, see now W. Gorler′s article ‘Philon aus Larissa’ in H. Flashar (ed.), Die Philosophic der Antike(Basel, 1994), vol. IV, pp. 915–37; C. Brittain, Philo of Larissa and the Fourth Academy(unpublished diss., Oxford, 1996).Google Scholar

¹⁰ In a similar way, of course, suspension of judgement is the appropriate course even for a Stoic when he finds is unachievable, so that the larger epistemological conclusions we can draw from the availability of this option to Plutarch in this work are strictly limited. For Plutarch on Arcesilaus see adv. Col.1121F-1124B. Cf. also de Stoic, rep.10, 1037BC for Plutarch′s defence of Google Scholar

¹¹ See 949E. It might be worth noting that the Stoics use the pores as a prime example of something whose existence cannot be perceived: their existence is deduced from the fact that sweat flows through the skin: S.E. adv. math.8.306. This presumably leaves wide open to debate j the Stoics′ assertion that we are cool after a sweat because the pores are relaxed and the air flows in, for we can see neither the pores and their relaxed state nor the supposed influx of air.Google Scholar

¹² See 954BC. This is an interesting example, because it could easily, perhaps more easily, have been used by Plutarch to show that water is actually warm. So it is striking that he does not attribute the relative warmth of the seaside to the sea water,but rather to the sea air.The point Plutarch actually seems to want to make is that air, which is naturally warm, is just not cooled down so muchby the sea as it is by the land.Google Scholar

¹³ If it should be objected that Plutarch′s search for an answer that ‘greatlyexceeds in plausibility’ (TJJ cf. 955C) seems intended for a requirement that he expects not to be met, we should compare quaest conviv.700B. There we find another controversial Platonic theory (the thesis that drink passes through the lungs) described precisely as being ‘by far the most likely solution’ to the discussion: eiicoTa yap .Google Scholar

¹⁴ That neither of these passages brings out the fact that earth is colderthan water (as fire is warmerthan air), which is part of the Platonic schema, and part of the conclusion of the deprim. frig.,is to be explained by the contexts from which they are taken. For neither Atticus nor Macrobius are making points which require this level of detail, whereas the question is, of course, central to Plutarch′s investigation.Google Scholar

¹⁵ I have argued elsewhere (cf. note 1 above) that Plutarch does something very similar in the de Stoicorum repugnantiis:this work too is set up on a sceptical model, but the evidence it presents apparently inclines to support the positive philosophy–the Platonism–held by Plutarch himself.Google Scholar