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Rethinking Kant—Again1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Manfred Kuehn
Affiliation:
Purdue University

Extract

This is a highly interesting book, and one that is, in its own way, most important. The Structure of Experience is well written and effectively argued. It shows Gordon Nagel to be a rigorous and independent thinker who is as well acquainted with Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as he is with modern analytic philosophy. Because he has been successful in avoiding “to presuppose a background in Kant studies”, the book can indeed “be read by anyone interested in perception, cognition, or the philosophy of mind” (vii). In fact, it is to be recommended as an introduction to recent epistemology as well as to Kant. And this is perhaps as it should be, as the study of Kant has deeply influenced the broader developments of contemporary philosophy. P. F. Strawson, Jonathan Bennett, Richard Rorty, and Barry Stroud, to name only a few of the best-known figures, all developed their own views in conscious dependence upon and/or opposition to Kant. Since Nagel is firmly rooted in this tradition, his book may be taken as a contribution to both the study of Kant and the discussion of contemporary philosophieal issues.

Type
Critical Notices/Etudes critiques
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1985

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References

2 See, for instance, 3f., 4f., 33–39, 64–67, 70–74, 75, 77–80, 87f., 101f., 118. 123f., 137–141. 185–188, 233f. He gives modern commentators some of their own medicine. See. for instance, 64: “It is quite mistaken to suppose, as Bennett does …”; 72: “Everything has gone astray in Bennett's account”; 87: “Here I will clear up a confusion of Wolff's”: 137: “Each of Walker's objections misses the point; and each counterproposal he makes begs the question”.

3 I do not agree with Nagel that this exhausts “all” Kant has to say. But with the exception of(iv)—which is not really discussed by Nagel anyway—it does represent a fair reconstruction of the System of Principles.

4 On 73f. Nagel observes that “[o]ne of the problems with secondary literature is that it can take on a life of its own, quite independent of the original text, and self-reinforcing as each critic reiterates the findings of other critics”. To the extent that he is merely correcting particular mistakes, his book does not overcome this problem either.