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From Concept to Judgement: Rethinking Hegel's Overcoming of Formal Logic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2010

Richard Dien Winfield
Affiliation:
University of Georgia

Abstract

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Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2001

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References

Notes

1 For a further exploration of these issues, see Maker, William, Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), pp. 106–14Google Scholar, and Winfield, Richard Dien, Freedom and Modernity (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 3–13.Google Scholar

2 The tendency of contemporary formal logics to ignore syllogism in favour of a more abstract propositional calculus reflects an abandonment of the Kantian distinction between reason and understanding.

3 The fact that the successive editions of Hegel's Encyclopedia Logic and Science of Logic present somewhat variant orderings of categories does not of itself impugn either the necessity of immanent development or the systematicity of Hegel's own pioneering efforts. Not only may much of the variation involve terminological as opposed to conceptual discrepancies, but the variation may reflect the uncovered deficiency of early versions, rather than an equal validity for each alternate route. Of course, that none of Hegel's versions may be adequate in all respects still leaves unchallenged the unique trajectory of categorial self-development.

4 For a further discussion of how the categories of essence lead through reciprocity to the self-determined determinacy of the concept, see Winfield, Richard Dien, “Concept, Individuality and Truth,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, 39/40 (1999): 3839, 42.Google Scholar

5 Hegel, G. W. F., Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816) (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994), p. 31Google Scholar, and Hegel, G. W. F., Science of Logic, translated by Miller, A. V. (New York: Humanities Press, 1969), p. 599.Google Scholar

6 Hegel, G. W. F., Werke, Vol. 7: Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), paragraphs 5-7, pp. 4954Google Scholar, and Hegel, G. W. F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, translated by Nisbet, H. B. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), paragraphs 5-7, pp. 3742.Google Scholar

7 For this reason, logic presupposes overcoming the opposition of consciousness, something that Hegel seeks to achieve in The Phenomenology of Spirit, which observes how the structure of consciousness eliminates itself as the hegemonic principle of knowing by subjecting its own truth claims to selfexamination and discovering that when consciousness's relation to its object becomes identical to the object as it is purportedly in itself, an identity required for true knowing, the distinction between knowing and its object collapses, removing consciousness as the foundation of knowledge. For a more sustained analysis of how and why logic presupposes the overcoming of the opposition of consciousness, see Maker, Philosophy Without Foundations, pp. 47-98.

8 Hegel, G. W. F., Werke, Vol. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), addition 2 to paragraph 163, p. 313Google Scholar, and Hegel, G. W. F., Logic, translated by Wallace, William (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), addition 2 to paragraph 163, p. 228.Google Scholar

9 For a further treatment of these issues, see Winfield, “Concept, Individuality and Truth,” pp. 41-45.

10 Class and genus might both be disqualified as forms of universality if one identifies universals with inhering qualities and observes that class and genus cannot be predicated of individuals. Yet that class and genus have individuality, distinguishing each class and genus from every other, is something class and genus share with inhering properties, for even inhering property as such has a determinacy differentiating it from every other instance of what inheres. For further discussion of how universality ineluctably entails individuality, see Winfield, Freedom and Modernity, pp. 51-58.

11 Foster, Michael B. develops these points in his article, “The Concrete Universal: Cook Wilson and Bosanquet” (Mind, 40, 157 [January 1931]: 4, 910).Google Scholar

12 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 40Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 607.

13 In this connection, Hegel maintains that the categories are grasped as determinate concepts insofar as each is known as being in unity with its other. That unity is, of course, precisely what determinate negation involves, where a category engenders something different from itself as its own truth. See Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 40Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 607.

14 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), pp. 33Google Scholar, 38, 55, and Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 601, 605, 620.

15 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 39Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 606.

16 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 40Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 607.

17 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 53Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 618.

18 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), pp. 61Google Scholar, 62, and Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 626-27; Hegel, , Werke, Vol. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, paragraph 167, p. 319Google Scholar; and Hegel, Logic, paragraph 167, pp. 232-33.

19 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), pp. 78, 7980Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 641-43.

20 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 59Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 624.

21 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 59Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 624.

22 Hegel, , Werke, Vol. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, addition to paragraph 171, p. 322Google Scholar, and Hegel, Logic, p. 236.

23 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 66Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 630.

24 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 56Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 621.

25 Hegel, , Werke, Vol. 8: Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, paragraph 165, p. 315Google Scholar, and Hegel, Logic, paragraph 165, pp. 229-30.

26 Hegel, , Werke, Vol. 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, paragraph 165, p. 315Google Scholar, and Hegel, Logic, paragraph 165, pp. 229-30.

27 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 56Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 621.

28 Hegel, , Wissenschaft der Logik: Die Lehre vom Begriff (1816), p. 56Google Scholar, and Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 621.