^{page 159 note 1} First edition, 1757. References to this work are given as Review, followed by the page number. The reference is to the first edition unless otherwise stated.

^{page 160 note 1} Preface to the Sermons: “There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy and constitution, from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature.”

^{page 160 note 2} Review, p. 7.

^{page 161 note 1} E.g. Paton, H. J.'s The Coherence Theory of GoodnessGoogle Scholar.

^{page 161 note 2} Review, p. 10.

^{page 161 note 3} Ibid., p. 11.

^{page 162 note 1} Review, p. 15.

^{page 162 note 2} Ibid., p. 15. It is worth noting how explicitly Price makes the essential point made by Professor Moore in his attack on the naturalistic fallacy. Principia Ethica, § 13.

^{page 162 note 3} Review, p. 16.

^{page 162 note 4} Cf. Ewing, A. C., Idealism, p. 417Google Scholar.

^{page 162 note 5} Ibid., p. 17.

^{page 163 note 1} Cf. Ewing, A. C., Idealism, p. 14Google Scholar.

^{page 163 note 2} Review, p. 169.

^{page 164 note 1} Review, p. 65.

^{page 164 note 2} DrMartineau, has put this objection as follows: “… the feeling of obligation, the enthusiasm of approval, are absolutely integral to the moral judgement, and not consecutive upon it; they constitute its very form, so that we cannot even conceive of its holding any contents without them; take them away, and the intellectual matter of the judgement will go with them.”—Types of Ethical Theory, 3, II, p. 480Google Scholar.

^{page 166 note 1} Review, p. 216.

^{page 166 note 2} Ibid., p. 180.

^{page 166 note 3} Ibid., p. 229.

^{page 167 note 1} Review, p. 231.

^{page 167 note 2} Ibid., p. 278.

^{page 167 note 3} Ibid., p. 238.

^{page 168 note 1} Review, pp. 265–6.

^{page 168 note 2} Ibid., p. 266. In using the term greater good Price seems to imply that the duty of gratitude is founded on the consequential good. He has, however, denied that this is so. But the contradiction can be resolved if we suppose that there is a good in gratitude that is not consequential, e.g. if the world is better merely in the fact that a benefit conferred by A on B is repaid by an action of B with reference to A.

^{page 168 note 3} Ibid., p. 298.

^{page 169 note 1} Review, p. 295.

^{page 169 note 2} Ibid., p. 308.

^{page 169 note 3} Ibid., p. 308.

^{page 169 note 4} Ibid., p. 309.

^{page 169 note 5} Ibid., p. 302.

^{page 170 note 1} Review, p. 321.

^{page 170 note 2} Ibid., p. 325.

^{page 170 note 3} Ibid., p. 327.

^{page 170 note 4} Ibid., p. 339.

^{page 171 note 1} Review, pp. 114–115.

^{page 171 note 2} Ibid., p. 117.

^{page 172 note 1} Review, p. 126.

^{page 172 note 2} Ibid., p. 389.

^{page 172 note 3} Ibid., p. 468.

^{page 173 note 1} Review, p. 92.

^{page 173 note 1} Ibid., pp. 95–96.