^{page 207 note 1} It is, of course, impossible to discuss here in full the very controversial relations between thinking and being. The assumption that being is at the basis of thinking, although I personally am inclined to deem it correct, need be accepted by the reader only as a convenient working hypothesis.

^{page 208 note 1} See Conze, E., Der Satz vom Widerspruch, 1932, 4–77.Google Scholar

^{page 211 note 1} The following description of the relation of the Heracleitean world to the P.C. and its conditions is taken from Plato's Theaitetos and Cratylos, and from different passages of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Asclepius. For the exact references, see Conze, E., Der Satz votn Widerspruch, 1932, n. 29.Google Scholar

^{page 213 note 1} See Conze, E., Der Satz vom Widerspruch, 1932, 368–370.Google ScholarGrenville, Robert (Lord Brook), The Nature of Truth, 1640, p. 100Google Scholar: “I fully conclude with Aristotle's Adversaries, Anaxagoras, Democritus, etc. That Contradictories may be simul and semel in the same Subject, same Instant, same Notion (not only in two distinct respects or notions, as one thing may be causa and effectum, Pater and Filius, respectu diversi; but even in the same respect, under one and the same Notion).”

^{page 217 note 1} I can deal here only with this one aspect of Hegelian dialectics. In a separate article I hope to discuss all the fundamental assumptions as to the ultimate nature of reality and as to the nature and task of man, which are implied in Hegelian dialectics.