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Paradox, Confirmation and Inquiry

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Paul T. Sagal
Paul T. Sagal
Affiliation:
New Mexico State University
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 51 , Issue 198 , October 1976 , pp. 467 - 470
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1976

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References

1 Quine, W. V., The Ways of Paradox (Random House, 1966)Google Scholar.

2 Quine, W. V., ‘Natural Kinds’, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1969)Google Scholar.

3 This is not Goodman's way of defining ‘grue’. The above definition suffices for our purposes.

4 Normal sets are sets whose members are not members of themselves.

5 Quine, W. V., ‘Natural Kinds’, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 128–129Google Scholar.