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³³ Previous versions of this paper have been read at the Philosophy Club in the University of St Andrews, at the State University of New York at Albany, and at the Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic in the University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to the discussions on those occasions, and to Adam Morton, Tom Nagel, Peter Railton, Richard Rorty, and Alan Spiro at Princeton, for criticisms which have saved me from many errors. I am also indebted to the University of St Andrews for a period of sabbatical leave, and to the Philosophy Department of Princeton University for encouraging me to come as a Visiting Fellow.