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A Note on the Emotive Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Jon Wheatley
Jon Wheatley
Affiliation:
University of British Columbia.
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Extract

I am going to take the statement: “Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion”, as the kernel of the Emotive Theory and any variant of the Emotive Theory not covered by this statement is left untouched by what I have to say.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 130 , July 1959 , pp. 235 - 236
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1959

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References

page 325 note 1 This is part of a longer quotation from Ayer which reads as follows: “In so far as statements of value are significant, they are ordinary ‘scientific’ statements; and in so far as they are not scientific, they are not in the literal sense significant, but are simply expressions of emotion which can be neither true nor false.” Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic (1935), New York, Dover, 1946, Ch. IV, p.102.Google Scholar