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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
It is one of the objects of what is sometimes called “general theory of value” to study all sorts of value judgments or (what would be a better name for them) evaluational judgments. But what the sorts of evaluational judgment are is a question that has so far by no means been settled. There are only two kinds of evaluational judgment that are universally recognized and that have well–established names, the ethical or moral, and the aesthetic. Another pair that have sometimes been mentioned are the prudential and the economic. The object of this paper is to direct attention to still another, quite distinct, sort of evaluational judgment which we commonly make, to give judgments of this sort a name, and to characterize them in a provisional way.
1 From χαρíευτoς, genitive of χαρíεις. “…in At[tic Greek/ χαρíειςwas very often used of persons, in relation to qualities of mind, graceful, elegant, accomplished,…oí χαρíευτες men of taste, men of education0…op[posed to/ oí поλλoí…” (Liddell and Scott, A Greek–English Lexicon, 6th ed., 1869.)
