Christopher Cherry's article in the January 1973 issue of this journal has on its first page the sentence ‘And when a philosopher writes that “no clear idea is available to us of what moral scepticism amounts to”, that moral scepticism would, if it were possible at all, have to be a “specially cooked-up affair” by contrast with other varieties of scepticism, it is hard not to accuse him of just such a vice.’ He means the vice of disingenuousness and the person to whom he attributes it is me. I did not write what he says I wrote and neither of his quotations is accurate. On the next page Cherry claims again to be summarizing a view of mine when he says that ‘An “intellectual moral scepticism” would, if it were anything, have to be a peculiarly cooked-up affair, and so by implication different from other forms of intellectual philosophical scepticism. It is not a species of the same genus.’