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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
There have been a number of attacks on the idea of human rights recently, both in the course of political and diplomatic encounters across the globe, as well as in the more systematic literature of political philosophy. These attacks do not always distinguish between the Lockean, negative and the more recent positive rights traditions. For example, at the 1993 summer conference on Human Rights in Vienna, Austria, many diplomats from different regions of the world raised such questions as 'When we speak of human rights, are these conditions that everyone everywhere ought to enjoy?’Is it perhaps the case that human rights are one thing for people in one part of the globe and another for those in another part?' These questions were raised in large part about the rights spelled out in the United Nations Declaration of Universal Human Rights, including both (so called) negative and positive rights–e.g., the rights to freedom of expression and to public education, respectively.
1 See, Machan, Tibor R., ‘Some Recent Work in Human Rights Theory’Google Scholar and Rex, Martin and Nickel, James W. ‘Recent Work on the Concept of Rights,’ in Lucey, Kenneth G., (ed.), Recent Work in Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983), for surveys of such effort between the 1940s and 1980s in the Anglo-American philosophical community.Google Scholar
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8 Ibid.
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