^{page 193 note 1} I wish to thank Leonora, Rosenfield forsome helpful suggestions, though she is of course in no way responsible forwhat I have written.Google Scholar

^{page 193 note 2} Trans. by Gertrude Carman, Bussey as Man a Machine (published together with the French text of a Leyden edition of 1748), p. 100.Google Scholar

^{page 194 note 1} Ibid., pp. 140-141.

^{page 195 note 1} Trans. by Ernest Chester, Thomas, First Book, Fourth Section, Chapter I, p. 75. Also,Google Scholarsee Aram, VartarianLa Mettriěs ĽHomme Machine, pp. 19-20.Google Scholar

^{page 195 note 2} See his ‘ On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History’, (1874)Google Scholar and ‘On Descartes’ “Discourse Touching the Method of Using One's Reason Rightlyandof Seeking Scientific Truth”, (1870), reprinted as Chapters V and IV in Method and Results, Vol. I in the Essays.Google Scholar

^{page 195 note 3} As contained in Herbert, Feigl's ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”,’ in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 2, Eds. Herbert, Feigl, Michael, Scriven and Grover, Maxwell, pp. 370–497.Google ScholarSee especially Feigl's interesting and sympatheticrendering of Descartes' bête machine doctrine, p. 412.Google ScholarHowever, it is Descartes's physiologising of the soul and not the bête machine doctrine which give rise to the similarities with Feigl's monism.Google Scholar Also see Smart's, J. J.G.‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, Philosophical Review, 68 (1959) pp. 141–156,CrossRefGoogle Scholar and his paper ‘Materialism’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 60, No.22: 10.24th, 1963, pp. 651–662.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 197 note 1} This points up a difference between the tradition of Mechanistic philosophy which involves the topic of Mentality and Machines and derives ultimately from Descartes' physiologising andbête machine doctrine, and that which is usually referred to as the Vitalist/Mechanist controversy or the Teleology vs. Mechanism discussions. Here Descartes may be seen as having already assumed answers to the major issue involved in the latter controversies. He is not generally concerned with distinctions between the animate and inanimate.Google Scholar

^{page 197 note 2} In the Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans, by Haldane, Elizabeth S.Google Scholar and Ross, G. R. T., from Discourse on Method, Vol. I, p. 116. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from French texts are by Donna Gunderson.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 1} Loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 2} Loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 3} Loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 198 note 4} Loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 199 note 1} Op. cit., p. 117.Google Scholar

^{page 200 note 1} In Cohen's, Leonora D.(later Leonora Rosenfield) ‘Descartes and Henry More on the Beast-Machine—A Translation of their Correspondence Pertaining to Animal Automatism’, from Annals of Science, A Quarterly Review of the History of Science since the Renaissance, Vol. 1, No. 1, 01 15, 1936, p. 53.Google ScholarFrom a letter dated 02 5, 1649.Google Scholar

^{page 200 note 2} Ibid., p. 55. From a letter dated 04 15, 1649Google Scholar

^{page 201 note 1} Op. cit., pp. 116-117.Google Scholar

^{page 201 note 2} Loc. cit.Google Scholar

^{page 202 note 1} Descartes does admit, however, that beasts are capable of a kind of purely mechanical or ‘unconscious’ feeling and sensation. This notion is left unclarified, though he seems tobe suggesting that certain reflex movements would perhaps involve feeling or sensations of a sort: a dog would, supposedly, in some mechanical way react to and feel a swift kick but would not, on Descartes' account, have pain. On the whole I believe Descartes does not argue as effectively for the claim that beasts lack all feeling and consciousness, as he does for the claim that they do not think or reason. Since he generally centres his remarks around the latter claim, we shall too. See his letter to More, 02 5, 1649, op. cit.Google Scholar Also Cohen's, footnote 9, p. 56, op. cit.Google ScholarCf. Vartanian, , Diderot and Descartes, p. 210.(Descartes apparently had a dog which he treated as if it were to be treated kindly. Malebranche and others were not above consistently (pun) kicking them.)Google Scholar

^{page 202 note 2} Cf. Balz, , op. cit., p.111.Google Scholar

^{page 202 note 3} In a very similar vein Hilary Putnam in his article ‘Minds and Machines’ indicates suspicion for certain dualistic arguments where he writes: ‘To put it differently, if themind-body problem is identified with any problem of more than purely conceptual interest (e.g. with the question of whether or not human beings have ‘souls ’), then either it must be that (a) no argument ever used by a philosopher sheds the slightest light onit (and this independently of the way the argument tends),Google Scholar or (b) that some philosophic argument for mechanism is correct, or (c) that some dualistic argument does show that both human beings andTuring machines have souls!Google Scholar I leave it to the reader to decide which of the three alternatives is at all plausible.’ In Dimensions of Mind, ed. Sidney, Hook, p. 176. There is little doubt that Putnam would regard arguments such as those in (c) as self-impugning—and for virtually the same sorts of reasons that people would regard arguments which proved that gnats were immortal as being for that reason much less convincing.Google Scholar

^{page 203 note 1} Oeuvres de Descartes, eds.Adam, and Tannery, , IV, p. 576.Google Scholar

^{page 204 note 1} Ibid.., p. 575.

^{page 204 note 2} Ibid., pp.575-576. But in her book From Beast-Machine to Man-Machins, Leonora, Rosenfield writes:Google Scholar ‘He knew the position of Montaigne and Charron as we have seen. But unlike his contemporary Chanet, he did not appear primarily motivated by the polemicist's desire to refute these two defenders of animal intelligence. This is evidenced by the fact that he mentioned them only casually, and then not until 1646.’ op. cit., p. 19. The letter she refers to is undoubtedly the one to the Earl of Newcastle from which we have quoted above. I do not wish to quarrel with Rosenfield's thesis. I assume that her main point is simply that Descartes had more general aims in mind than the refutation of one.or more particular writers. But I would emphasise point (b) above, and suggest that since Montaigne's views were He is thus not content simply to make the now old-hat point in biology and psychology that likeness in function does not guarantee likeness in structure or process.Google Scholar

^{page 206 note 1} Ibid., p.415.

^{page 206 note 2} He is thus not content simply to make the now old-hat point in biology and psychology that likeness in function does not guarantee likeness in structure or process.

^{page 206 note 3} The quoted phrases not taken from Montaigne, are from the Discourse, p.117.Google Scholar

^{page 206 note 4} Loc. cit.

^{page 207 note 1} As Turing, for example, did in his ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, in Mind, 59 236 (1950), pp.433–466.Google ScholarSee Keith, Gunderson, “The Imitation Game”, in Minds and Machines, edited by Alan Ross, Anderson, pp. 60–71,Google Scholar and forthcoming in Mind, where I argue against Turing's main thesis in a manner somewhat similar to the above.Google Scholar

^{page 208 note 1} Loc. cit.

^{page 209 note 1} But I am not dealing here with the general question of what, in principle, a computer might be programmed to do. Nor am Iassuming that certain types of computer programmes would not be more flexible from situation to situation, would not have to be replaced each time, would not be self-adjusting in various ways, etc.I am simply discussing the case where a new situation does demand a wholly new programme, and the computer's operation issues in a certain single result, (Or, in Descartes words, whose ‘organs have need of some specialadaptation for every particular action.’)Google Scholar

^{page 209 note 2} Montaigne's reasoning is even slipperier than Descartes seems to realise. In effect Montaigne argues from the particular skills of particular animals to the general conclusion that animalsare able to think, reason, and so forth, which could then be used, for example, as the basis for saying a bird can think. In other words, any one animal in effect gets credit for the skills of all other animals. The fox gets credit for the spider's weaving skills, and so forth.

^{page 209 note 3} As good or better than the one which the LGP-30 under the direction of Reiss, R. F. and Worth, R. M. composed called ‘Ode to a Depot‘By the new neighbours their depot was jade, These ulcers were new, many depots were suede.’Google ScholarIn San Francisco Review, Vol. I, No. 12, June 1962, p. 86.Google ScholarThe computer's ‘Elegy for a Lady ’ is closer to the style of Dylan, Thomas; see p.85.Google Scholar

^{page 210 note 1} Loc. tit.

^{page 210 note 2} Cf.Paul, Ziff's anti-computerophilic article, ‘The Feelings of Robots’, Analysis, Vol. 19, No. 3 (New Series No. 69), 01 1959, pp. 64-68, esp. pt. 9.Google Scholar

^{page 211 note 1} Of course just to point out that a subject was programmed to do what it does is not enough; conceivably a conscious subject could be programmed to worry about X and really do so, just as a man hypnotised to stomp his foot may really stomp it. It is whatone finds out when one finds out about a programme which counts, as in the case of the clock we find out that little metal springs and gears areall that's needed for constructing something to measure time.Google ScholarCf. Keith, Gunderson, ‘Interview With a Robot’, Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (New Series No. 96), 06 1963, pp. 136–142.Google Scholar

^{page 212 note 1} I shall continue to use the Bussey, translation of ĽHomme machine, but quotations from Histoire naturelle de ĽâdmeGoogle Scholar and Les Animaux plus que machines will be taken from La, Mettrie'sOeuvres philosophiques, Amsterdam, 1774, 3 vols.Google Scholar Nouvelle Edition, Corrigée ée. Here the Histoire naturelle de Ľ âme is printed in Vol. I under the title Traité de Ľ âme.Google Scholar

^{page 212 note 2} Oeuvres philosophiques, Vol. I, pp. 83-84.Google Scholar

^{page 213 note 1} Ibid., pp. 89-90.

^{page 213 note 2} Bussey, , pp. 142-143.Google Scholar

^{page 213 note 3} Ibid.., p. 146.

^{page 214 note 1} Oeuvres philosophiques, Vol. II, p. 29.Google Scholar

^{page 214 note 2} Ibid., p. 30.

^{page 214 note 3} Bussey, , p. 143.Google Scholar

^{page 215 note 1} For example, see Oeuvres philosophiques, Vol. II, pp. 78-81.Google Scholar

^{page 215 note 2} Bussey, , p. 141.Google Scholar

^{page 215 note 3} Ibid.., p. 140-141.

^{page 216 note 1} Ibid., pp. 143-144.. But see Aram, Vartanian'sLa Mettrie's ĽHomme Machine for a different interpretation of La Mettrie's position on the mind/body question. Also see his Diderot and Descartes, esp. Chap. IV.Google Scholar

^{page 216 note 2} Cf. ‘Nothing, as any one can see, is so simple as the mechanism of our education. Everything may be reduced to sounds or words that pass from the mouth of one through the ears of another into his brain.’Ibid.., p. 104.

^{page 216 note 3} Discourse, p. 116.

^{page 217 note 1} And also mentions one which could supposedly do more than that: ‘which could answer rationally, and which had learned to carry on a kind of connected conversation, as we do.’ Bussey, pp 101-102. This is mentioned during the course of his discussion of the ape, and is obviously closer to the goals he envisions for the ape than mere mimicry would be.

^{page 217 note 2} Ibid., pp. 102-103.

^{page 217 note 3} Ibid., p. 103.

^{page 218 note 1} Oeuvres philosophiques, Vol. I, p. 84.Google Scholar

^{page 218 note 2} Ibid., p. 152.

^{page 218 note 3} Oeuvres philosophiques, Vol. I I, pp. 31-32.Google Scholar

^{page 219 note 1} And it is also worth nothing that La Mettrie never fully grasped other specifics of the běte machine doctrine either. If he had realised that the way in which Descartes developedhis argument involved the assumption that there is a physiological parallel between man's vocal faculties and those of the animals, he would have understood that to attribute the disparity in linguistic ability between man and beast to slight physical variations, involved challenging the empirical assumption Descartes needed to establish the need of a non-mechanistic explanation of human linguistic performances.

^{page 220 note 1} Cartesian Studies, p. 110. For similar construals of the continuity between the běte machine doctrine and the homme machineGoogle Scholar see Boring's, E. G.A History of Experimental Psychology, p.623;Google ScholarMahaffy's, J. P.Descartes, pp. 63-64;Google Scholar and Vartanian's, A.Diderot and Descartes, esp. Chap. V.Google Scholar

^{page 221 note 1} History of Materialism, Bk. p. 246.Google Scholar

^{page 221 note 2} Trans, by Taylor, T., incl. in same vol. as the Treatise Concerning the Search After Truth, cited above; p. 201.Google Scholar