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Two Types of Scepticism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Douglas Odegard
Affiliation:
University of Guelph

Extract

Suppose that a jury in a murder trial brings in a verdict of guilty and one of the jurors still wonders whether the verdict is a good one, although he is not inclined to try to have it reversed. Is his attitude coherent?

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1979

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References

1 See Hintikka, , ‘“Knowing That One Knows” Reviewed’, Synthese 21 (1970), 141162CrossRefGoogle Scholar. References are to this article.

2 See Popper, , Objective Knowledge (Oxford, 1972)Google Scholar. Quotations are from this book.

3 See Unger, , Ignorance: a Case for Scepticism (Oxford, 1975)Google Scholar. References are to this book.

4 See Stroud, , ‘Review of Unger's Ignorance’, Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977), 246257CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Quotations are from this article.

5 See Malcolm, , Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, 1963)Google Scholar. References are to this book.

6 See Wittgenstein, , On Certainty (Oxford, 1969)Google Scholar. References are to numbered sections in this book.

7 Contrast Malcolm, 's views in Thought and Knowledge (Ithaca, 1977), Chs. 8 and 9.Google Scholar

8 See Moore, , ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in Philosophical Papers (London, 1959)Google Scholar. References are to this article.