^{page 245 note 1} Smart, J. J. C., ‘The Existence of God’, reprinted in New Essays in Philosophical Theology (SCM Press, 1955), ed. Flew, and Maclntyre, , pp. 28–46.Google Scholar Citations of this essay are from this source. This essay is contained also in a number of anthologies and basic text books in introductory philosophy.

^{page 246 note 1} The quotations are from Lafleur's translation of The Meditations (Bobbs-Merrill, 1960).Google Scholar It makes use of both Latin originals and French translations approved by Descartes. The texts cited aboveare sometimes from Lafleur's conflation of French and Latin editions, however my case can be argued from the Latin text alone. Both Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm, in that chronological order, have argued that existence is a predicate in the Anselmian version of the argument. Malcolm says that ‘although it is an error to regard existence as a property of things that have contingent existence, it does not follow that it is an error to regard necessary existence as a property of God’. The Malcolm paper is reprinted in Plantinga, ed. The Ontologial Argument, the statement in question is on p. 148.

^{page 247 note 1} St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 11, 3. The logical trap is understandable. Necessary existence is a way of being, whereas whether a being exists or not is a matter of fact. It is logically possible that no beings with necessary existence actually exist, argument of Hartshorne from modal logic to the effect that the class of necessary beings cannot be a null class notwithstanding, in my opinion.

^{page 248 note 1} Geach's observation is that the cosmological arguments are of the form ‘since the world is of such-and-such a nature, there must be some being who made it and keeps it going’, p. 58 of Com mentary on Aquinas' reprinted in The Cosmological Arguments, ed. Burrill, (Doubleday, 1967).Google Scholar He observes further, with regard to the third way, ‘the necessity or contingency that is here in question is not the logical necessity or contingency of some (existential) statement’ (p. 65). Copleston has observed that the argument is not one of logical entailment or analysis but one of a metaphysical analysis involving ontological or causal entailment. See Aquinas (Penguin, n.d.), p. 114.Google Scholar

^{page 249 note 1} Perhaps the organism analogy is better, perhaps it is not. However it is instructive to note that those who do find the organismic analogy better tend to find the teleological argument one of their chief sources of support. The process tradition, as presented in the works of Whitehead and Hartshorne, are excellent cases in point.

^{page 249 note 2} Matson, Wallace, The Existence of God (Cornell, 1965), p. 88.Google Scholar

^{page 250 note 1} See Paley's views on pp. 20, 86 and elsewhere in Natural Theology: Selections, ed. Ferré, (Bobbos-Merrill, 1963).Google Scholar