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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The most important recent philosophical treatment of Ghristology is that of Thomas V. Morris in The Logic of God Incarnate, defending the high-orthodox position that ‘Jesus of Nazareth was one and the same person as God the Son, the Second Person of the divine Trinity’ (p. 13) against the charge that the characteristics of deity and humanity are non-compossible in one person at one time, so that it is a contradiction to attribute both sets of qualities to the historical Jesus of Nazareth. I believe that Morris's defence, impressive though it is, does not succeed but on the contrary provides yet another illustration of the thesis that any attempt to spell out the idea of divine incarnation as a metaphysical theory, rather than as religious metaphor or myth, is bound to be unacceptable or, in traditional terminology, heretical.
page 409 note 1 Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986.
page 417 note 1 See, for example, Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, The Meaning and End of Religion (1962, London: SPCK, and San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978).Google Scholar
page 420 note 1 For example, Gandhi, Ramchandra in I am Thou (Poona: Indian Philosophical Quarterly Publications, 1984), p. 46.Google Scholar
page 423 note 1 I have advocated this view elsewhere – e.g. ‘Jesus and the World Religions’ in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. Hick, John (London: S.C.M. Press and Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977)Google Scholar, and ‘An Inspiration Christology for a Religiously Plural World’ in Encountering Jesus, ed. Davis, Stephen T. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1988).Google Scholar
