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Divine providence, simple foreknowledge, and the ‘Metaphysical Principle’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2004

MICHAEL D. ROBINSON
Affiliation:
Department of Religion and Philosophy, Cumberland College, 7989 College Station Drive, Williamsburg, Kentucky 40769-1331

Abstract

In this essay, I challenge David P. Hunt's defence of the utility of simple foreknowledge for divine providence against the ‘Metaphysical Principle’. This principle asserts that circular causal loops are impossible. Hunt agrees with this principle but maintains that so long as the deity does not use simple foreknowledge in such a way that causal loops unfold, the Metaphysical Principle in not violated. I argue that Hunt's position still allows for the possibility of such causal loops and this itself is a breach of the Metaphysical Principle.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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