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The No-Minimum argument, satisficing, and no-best-world: a reply to Jeff Jordan

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 November 2012

CHRIS DRAGOS
CHRIS DRAGOS*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Ryerson University, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, Ontario, M5B 2K3, Canada Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Victoria College, Room 316, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1K7, Canada
*
e-mail: chris.dragos@mail.utoronto.ca
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Abstract

Peter van Inwagen's ‘No-Minimum’ argument boldly rejects a proposition widely accepted by theists and atheists alike: God and gratuitous evil are incompatible. Jeff Jordan (2003) criticizes van Inwagen's argument and (Jordan 2011) defends his position against Michael Schrynemakers (2007). I present two criticisms of Jordan. Concerning his first paper, I argue that if it is plausible to suppose that there exist undetectable evils, Jordan's argument is incomplete. Concerning his second paper, I show how Jordan fails to engage adequately with Schrynemakers's reply and, more seriously, with the notion of satisficing implicit in van Inwagen's No-Minimum argument. To draw out this second criticism, I make use of another debate in the philosophy of religion: the problem of no-best-world.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 49 , Issue 3 , September 2013 , pp. 421 - 429
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012 

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