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moral heuristics: rigid rules or flexible inputs in moral deliberation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

elizabeth anderson
Affiliation:
department of philosophy, university of michigan, ann arbor, mi 48109-1003 eandersn@umich.edu http://www-personal.umich.edu/~eandersn/

Abstract

sunstein represents moral heuristics as rigid rules that lead us to jump to moral conclusions, and contrasts them with reflective moral deliberation, which he represents as independent of heuristics and capable of supplanting them. following john dewey's psychology of moral judgment, i argue that successful moral deliberation does not supplant moral heuristics but uses them flexibly as inputs to deliberation. many of the flaws in moral judgment that sunstein attributes to heuristics reflect instead the limitations of the deliberative context in which people are asked to render judgments.

Type
open peer commentary
Copyright
2005 cambridge university press

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