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Confabulation, confidence, and introspection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 April 2009

Brian Fiala
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. fiala@email.arizona.edusbn@email.arizona.eduhttp://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/
Shaun Nichols
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. fiala@email.arizona.edusbn@email.arizona.eduhttp://dingo.sbs.arizona.edu/~snichols/

Abstract

Carruthers' arguments depend on a tenuous interpretation of cases from the confabulation literature. Specifically, Carruthers maintains that cases of confabulation are “subjectively indistinguishable” from cases of alleged introspection. However, in typical cases of confabulation, the self-attributions are characterized by low confidence, in contrast to cases of alleged introspection.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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