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Are prototypes and exemplars used in distinct cognitive processes?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2010

James Virtel  and
Gualtiero Piccinini
James Virtel
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri–St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400. jlv4z3@umsl.edupiccininig@umsl.eduwww.umsl.edu/~piccininig/
Gualtiero Piccinini
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri–St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63121-4400. jlv4z3@umsl.edupiccininig@umsl.eduwww.umsl.edu/~piccininig/
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Abstract

We argue that Machery provides no convincing evidence that prototypes and exemplars are typically used in distinct cognitive processes. This partially undermines the fourth tenet of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis and thus casts doubts on Machery's way of splitting concepts into different kinds. Although Machery may be right that concepts split into different kinds, such kinds may be different from those countenanced by the Heterogeneity Hypothesis.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 2-3 , June 2010 , pp. 226 - 227
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

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