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Defending intentionalist accounts of self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 1997

Jose Luis Bermudez
Jose Luis Bermudez
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, Scotlandjb10@stir.ac.uk
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Abstract

This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 20 , Issue 1 , March 1997 , pp. 107 - 108
Copyright
© 1997 Cambridge University Press

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