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Behavioral and Brain Sciences (1997), 20: 127-134 Cambridge University Press
Copyright © 1997 Cambridge University Press


Author's Response
Mele: Real self-deception

Understanding and explaining real self-deception


Alfred R. Mele a1
a1 Department of Philosophy, Davidson College, Davidson, NC 28036 almele@davidson.edu

Abstract

This response addresses seven main issues: (1) alleged evidence that in some instances of self-deception an individual simultaneously possesses “contradictory beliefs”; (2) whether garden-variety self-deception is intentional; (3) whether conditions that I claimed to be conceptually sufficient for self-deception are so; (4) significant similarities and differences between self-deception and interpersonal deception; (5) how instances of self-deception are to be explained, and the roles of motivation in explaining them; (6) differences among various kinds of self- deception; (7) whether a proper conception of self-deception implies that definitive ascriptions of self-deception to individuals are impossible.



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