Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-ws8qp Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-28T23:47:58.979Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Whither structured representation?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 1999

Arthur B. Markman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712 markman@psy.utexas.edu www.psy.utexas.edu/psy/faculty/markman/index.html
Eric Dietrich
Affiliation:
Program in Philosophy, Computers, and Cognitive Science, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902-6000 dietrich@binghamton.edu www.binghamton.edu/philosophy/home/faculty/index.html

Abstract

The perceptual symbol system view assumes that perceptual representations have a role-argument structure. A role-argument structure is often incorporated into amodal symbol systems in order to explain conceptual functions like abstraction and rule use. The power of perceptual symbol systems to support conceptual functions is likewise rooted in its use of structure. On Barsalou's account, this capacity to use structure (in the form of frames) must be innate.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)