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Neurophenomenological constraints and pushing back the subjectivity barrier

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 1999

Bruce MacLennan
Affiliation:
Computer Science Department, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996 maclennan@cs.utk.edu www.cs.utk.edu/~mclennan

Abstract

In the first part of this commentary I argue that a neurophenomenological analysis of color reveals additional asymmetries that preclude undetectable color transformations, without appealing to weak arguments based on Basic Color Categories (BCCs); that is, I suggest additional factors that must be included in “an empirically accurate model of color experience,” and which break the remaining asymmetries. In the second part I discuss the “isomorphism constraint” and the extent to which we may predict the subjective quality of experience from its neurological correlates. Protophenomena are discussed as a way of capturing in a relational structure all of qualitative experience except for the bare fact of subjectivity.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
© 1999 Cambridge University Press

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