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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 January 2009
Etymology might encourage us to begin a discussion of Aristotle on philanthropy with a discussion of philanthropia; and it is instructive to see why this is not quite the right place to look. The Greek term initially refers to a generalized attitude of kindness and consideration for a human being. The gods accuse Prometheus of being a ‘human-lover’, intending the term in an unfavorable sense, when he confers on human beings the benefits that should have been confined to the gods. Aristotle uses the abstract noun only once, to refer to sympathetic fellow-feeling (Rhet. 1390a18–23); and he mentions our feeling of kinship with other human beings to explain our approval of the philanthropos person (Eth. Nic. 1155a16–21). Philanthropia is the attitude of a kind and considerate person, even if she lacks material resources, and it can be displayed without the transfer of material resources.
1 See Aeschylus, Prometheus Vinctus, 11, 28.
2 See Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. W., Dittenberger, 3rd edition, vol. 2 (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1917)Google Scholar, no. 906b. For other references, see Snell, B., The Discovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 246–252Google Scholar. This is in turn largely based on Tromp De Ruiter, S., “De vocis quae est philanthropia significatione atque usu,” Mnemosyne, vol. 59 (1931–32), pp. 271–306Google Scholar. For “Your Philanthropy” see Tromp de Ruiter, p. 301.
3 Tromp de Ruiter, “De vocis,”, p. 293.
4 Snell, Discovery, p. 252, referring to the use of to philanthropon for a tip.
5 These references are taken from OED, s.vv.
6 Quoted from Webster's New World Dictionary (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1934).
7 Kant, Immanuel, The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. M.J., Gregor (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 122Google Scholar (Akad., p. 453).
8 ‘Simply’ and ‘basic’ are important here. Aristotle certainly believes the holding of private property is just. On some issues that I treat very briefly here I have benefited from reading Fred Miller's “Aristotle on Property Rights,” presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy, March 1986.
9 Aristotle's argument from generosity arouses skepticism in Becker, L.C., Property Rights (London: Methuen, 1977), p. 86Google Scholar. “But turning remarks like these into a sound argument for property rights is a difficult task. It is difficult because the argument will depend on contestable premises about what counts as an element of virtuous character, as well as contestable premises about human behavior.” It is hard to find any argument for property, however, that does not rest on some contestable premises; this fact about Aristotle's argument is hardly a reason for dismissing it. Becker's more specific criticisms are much more reasonable; they are similar (though presented without much argument) to those I offer later.
10 Plato actually abolishes private property and the nuclear family only for the guardian class. I will not keep mentioning this restriction.
11 In 1263a35–6 I follow H. Richards in reversing the manuscript order of koinois and idois. His suggestion is mentioned, but not endorsed, in the apparatus of W.D. Ross's text (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957).
12 Aristotle's views on distinctness and unity in political contexts are favorably regarded by Nussbaum, M.C., “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity,” A.O., Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980)Google Scholar, chap. 21.1 do not discuss Artistotle's own use of the organic analogy in 1253a15–29, 1337a27–30; there is an apparent prima facie difficulty in making it consistent with his criticism of Plato's use of the analogy.
13 On leisure, see 1326b26–32, 1333a30-b5, 1334a2–40, 1337b28–32; cf. 1269a34–6, 1273a24–5, 1329a1–2, 1341a28. Leisure is not ‘being at leisure’, where that suggests being unoccupied; nor is it recreation as opposed to serious business (cf. EN 1176b27–1177a6).
14 Though my choices and decisions are important, they make less difference, and are less free, than they are when I am not constrained by the demands of necessity; under these constraints the difference between the virtuous and the vicious decision is less clear. (On necessity and voluntary action, see EN 1110a11–19, 1115b7–10, 1116a29-b3.) The virtuous person will act virtuously as far as he can; but his virtuous decision will not have the same opportunity to design his life that it will have when he has leisure. If the necessities of life do not constrain me to do just or temperate action (cf. 1318b 13–14), then it is entirely a matter for my decision, and the shape of my life will depend on my decision.
15 See 1265b40–1, where the common meals are said to be a democratic feature of the Spartan system. At 1330a4–5 Aristotle says he will explain later why he favors common meals, but he does not keep his promise anywhere in the extant Politics. Presumably the remark in 1330a2 about avoiding destitution gives at least part of his reason. Newman notices that Aristotle has quite a bit to explain: “Aristotle, we note, though he is strongly in favour of the household, is also strongly in favour of syssitia or public meal-tables, perhaps a somewhat antagonistic institution.” W.L., Newman, ed., The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1887–1902), vol. 1, p. 333Google Scholar. The same could be said about the public provision for common means in relation to private property.
16 On menial occupations see 1258b37–9, 1337b8–10, 1278a12, 17, 21, 1296b29, 1317a25, 1319a27, 1341b13, 1342a20, 22.
17 It is not clear that Aristotle always takes this view. See 1277b3–7, 1333a6–16, 1337b17–21, 1341b10–17, Rhet. 1419b7–9.
18 See 1317a40-b17; cf. 1259a39, 1307a34, 1310a28–36, 1318b39, 1319b30, Rhet. 1366a4.
19 It is also hard to say how far Aristotle has a plausible defense for private property in non-ideal states (though he clearly accepts it).
