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Spontaneous Market Order and Social Rules

A Critical Examination of F. A. Hayek's Theory of Cultural Evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Viktor Vanberg
Viktor Vanberg
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, George Mason University
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Extract

Discoverers of “market failures” as well as advocates of the general efficiency of a “true, unhampered market” sometimes seem to disregard the fundamental fact that there is no such thing as a “market as such.” What we call a market is always a system of social interaction characterized by a specific institutional framework, that is, by a set of rules defining certain restrictions on the behavior of the market participants, whether these rules are informal, enforced by private sanctions, or formal, enforced by a particular agency, the “protective state,” in J. M. Buchanan's (1975) terminology.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , April 1986 , pp. 75 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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