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Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, xiii + 270 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Giacomo Bonanno
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis

Abstract

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Type
Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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References

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