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Public Opinion and International Policy Choices: Global Commitments for Japan and Its Peers?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 August 2001

Davis B. Bobrow
Affiliation:
Professor of Public and International Affairs and Political Science, University of Pittsburgh
Mark A. Boyer
Affiliation:
Professor of Political Science and Director of the Connecticut Project in International Negotiation (CPIN), University of Connecticut

Abstract

To understand the prospects for global order and progress in the coming years, we explore the joint implications of three premises: (1) states advantaged by the current international order have stakes in its regularity and predictability, and thus in moving to counter or prevent threats to those stakes; (2) along impure public and club goods lines, they are more likely to make efforts to do so when some private or club benefits result; and (3) public opinion provides a bounded policy acceptance envelope offering incentives and disincentives to national political elites to act as envisioned by the first two premises. We present a mosaic of public opinion in major OECD countries (the US, Japan, and major EU members) on three policy areas – foreign aid, UN peace-keeping operations, and environmental quality – that contain international public goods elements. Actual contribution tendencies in those areas found in our previous work largely conform to the public opinion patterns reported here. Within the limits of available data, domestic political incentives as represented by public opinion warrant neither extreme optimism nor pessimism about the prospects for continuing contributions by OECD states to sustaining orderly functioning of the current world system.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2001 Cambridge University Press

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