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NOTE ON INDUCTION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2013

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Extract

Some logic textbooks say, as if it were the received wisdom, that inductive arguments are partly defined by the thinker's intentions. The claim is that an inductive argument is one where the premises are intended to make the conclusion likely. This contrasts with a deductive argument, where the premises are intended to entail the conclusion. However, since entailing is one way of making more likely, a further way to distinguish induction is needed. The addition offered is that the premises are not intended to entail the conclusion. Taken together, the result is:

(1) An argument is inductive if the premises are (a) intended to make the conclusion likely, but (b) not intended to entail the conclusion.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2013

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References

Paley, W., ‘The Watch and the Watchmaker,’ in Pojman & Rea (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, 5th ed., (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2008), 54–6.Google Scholar